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THE CHINESE IMMIGRANT IN FURTHER ASIA¹

IN entering upon their heritage in the Far East the people of the United States have the experience of four European nations to guide them in dealing with the all-important problem of Chinese immigration and labor. The conditions on the other side of the Pacific are so radically different from those which rightly or wrongly have determined our policy as to admitting the Asiatic workman into this country that we must dismiss old prejudices and learn to consider the Chinaman in our Eastern dependencies as an indispensable means to their economic development, not, as in our own country, an obstacle to our complete happiness. His nearness to the Philippine Islands and his ability and willingness to work in their tropical climate render us at once unable to exclude him from those shores and almost helpless without his steady industry to exploit them. It will be profitable and interesting to observe how he has been treated in these and similar regions by our predecessors the Spanish, the French, the Dutch, and the English.

The first and oldest of these colonizing nations has passed at length from the occupation of a few forlorn vestiges of empire which she was no longer fitted to retain, leaving to us, her successors, the sore legacy of her failure. For a time, doubtless, the business of restoring order in these islands of the East will press heavily upon us, but once fairly established our difficulties are likely to be rather economic than administrative. If the natives there prove themselves to be as fickle and fractious as they have been under the Spaniards we must look to China for the bulk of our labor supply, as they do elsewhere in the Archipelago, or fail utterly to make our holdings remunerative. That Spain neglected to do this was a chief cause of her political shipwreck, for the rebellions against which she was continually struggling were only the result and expression of economic collapse. Her first governors there, after founding Manila, very wisely encouraged the Chinese to settle in Luzon in order to promote trade from the mainland. Unfortunately this was a period of great and increasing disorder in China, when the empire was passing into the throes which portended the overthrow of the

¹ Paper read before the American Historical Association, at Boston, December 27, 1899.

Ming dynasty and the Manchu conquest. Piracy and buccaneering expeditions, by which thousands from the maritime provinces flourished exceedingly, gave the Spanish colonists an idea that the Chinese were dangerous fellows, to be watched and repressed wherever they settled. Added to this fear on the part of the Europeans was the jealousy of the native Tagals, who found themselves ousted from every lucrative pursuit the moment they were subjected to competition by Chinamen.

The result of these apprehensions was a resort to a policy with which the Spanish were familiar—that of extermination by massacre. The first fearful blow fell upon the Chinese in 1603, when in a few awful days twenty-three thousand of them were done to death by Spaniards and savage natives. The policy of slaughter once begun was more than once renewed,¹ but apprehensions of revenge induced the home government in the middle of the eighteenth century to order the entire exclusion of Chinese immigrants from the islands and the total expulsion of all those living there who had not been converted to Christianity. It was precisely the “hermit-nation policy” fostered and entertained at this period by China and Japan as regards Europeans, and universally condemned by these latter. But Spain was as incapable in execution as she was barren of policy. The order for exclusion was suicidal to the Spanish administrators; they got all their best pickings from taxing, fining and oppressing the Chinese in Luzon; their removal involved, therefore, the loss of their chief asset, and of course the edict from Madrid was never seriously enforced. A final effort to at least get rid of the Chinese trading class was made in 1804 by imposing prohibitive taxes upon shopkeepers which were remitted if they would go into the fields as laborers. But here their kindly and thoughtful rulers had omitted to take account of the prejudices of the Filipinos, who rose against the wretched Chinese and drove them back to the towns.²

In all this melancholy and disgraceful story of European ineptitude there appears to have been no desire on the part of either

¹ In 1639 some 20,000 are said to have perished in a six months' man-hunt conducted by Spaniards and Tagals. They were again set upon after the English occupation in 1763, and again so late as in 1819 when they were killed *en masse* in a cholera panic. J. Crawford, *Dictionary of the Indian Islands*, p. 349. Consul Stigand in *British Parliamentary Report*, F. O. Series, No. 1391, 1893. Guillemard, *Australasia*. J. Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*.

² Every European visitor to Manila testifies to its dependence upon the Chinese for its prosperity. Compare, *e. g.*, Lawrence Oliphant, Comte de Beauvoir, Bickmore, Wallace and others. Up to the end of the Spanish occupation the Chinese were taxed \$60 per annum for the right to keep shop; taxes on other activities ranged from \$12 to \$100. All their accounts had to be kept in Spanish. In spite of injustice and oppression, however, the Chinese in Luzon appear to have increased in the past half-century from some 8000 to about 100,000.

officials or priests from Spain to understand or deal fairly with their unpopular subjects of this race. To tax and bully and murder them until it was discovered that the colony was threatened with ruin for lack of traders and artisans, then to neglect the instructions from the home authorities and weakly admit them again into their unholy partnership in robbing the natives—this was all the system they could devise in dealing with one of the most expert and subtle peoples on the globe. The only success the Spanish attained with the Chinese community was got from recognizing “captains” elected from their own number, whose business it was to collect taxes and arrange all internal dissensions. Thus the Chinese could secure a tolerable degree of liberty at the price of an excessive taxation.

The other Catholic colonizing power in the East has shown herself to be less bigoted than Spain touching the religious welfare of her subjects, but she has yet something to learn in the matter of political toleration. Owing to her nearness to the populous provinces of China Proper, France has in Indo-China a military and political as well as an economic problem to solve as regards China. The situation there seems at first sight to be complicated by the legacy of hate left among the Chinese on both sides of the border because of their defeat in war and expulsion from Tongking. The French are rather disposed to read into the Oriental mind something of their own soreness over the loss of border provinces, and to conclude that the Chinese have no intention of acknowledging their discomfiture and abiding by their treaty.¹ But to those who best understand Chinese character it does not seem likely that they will ever be found antagonizing their self-interest by indulging in dreams of *revanche* if an opportunity of making money safely is vouchsafed them under French rule.

Taking up Cochinchina as the oldest of this colonial group first, it is evident that thus far French measures touching this delicate and important problem have been inspired by political rather than by economic motives. Fear of Chinese machinations among the more docile Annamese and of being overwhelmed in this region by their numbers prompted a heavy poll-tax upon them all alike. The Chinese government protested against an invidious distinction placed upon its subjects, and appealed to treaty stipulations. So the French placed a tax upon all Asiatics; and inasmuch as the Chinese alone travelled frequently or far a *Service de l'Immigration* was established at Saïgon to watch them and control, if possible, their immigration.²

¹ The argument is developed in the Report of M. Séville in the *Recueil de Délibérations du Congrès Colonial National*, 1888-1890, Tome II.

² Decree of November 24, 1874; also of April 6 and October 13, 1876. Under this *Service* or the Director of the Interior all the Chinese and their affairs in this colony were brought. Instructions issued January 10, 1879.

A Chinese reaching Saigon by sea, unless a contract laborer, had to be registered at the immigration bureau and receive a card. If he came overland he was made to buy a pass from the administrator and exchange this subsequently for a *permis de circulation* good for one month. For breaking these regulations the punishment was expulsion from the colony, and if the immigrant was caught returning he had to spend three years at the penitentiary. Exception to these rules and penalties was made in favor of women and children, who almost never immigrated and who were much desired. Decrees regulating, taxing, fining, punishing (and of course always irritating) the Chinese in the colony follow each other thick and fast during twenty years. The legislation is ever a matter of checks and hindrances, an artificial system that looks beautifully in Paris but works badly in Saigon. Here is a specimen: In November, 1880, the governor orders every Asiatic not a French citizen, unless he be a landowner or indentured laborer, to provide himself with a workman's book which is to contain his name, his prenomens, his birth-place, his occupation, the names or domicile of his parents if belonging to the colony, his signature, his photograph, his number and the date of its issue, with sundry remarks if any room remained for them. For such a book the fee was 2 frs. 50 centimes, and if lost a new one cost 2 frs. more. The population of the region was roughly estimated at two million souls; if every adult male there got his book it was not strange that the French *fonctionnaires*, though numerous, complained of being overworked in a tropical climate. Moreover these attempts at prevention and control did not in the least affect the influx of Chinese into the colony. By January, 1885, the notion of the little book was allowed to drop in so far as immigrating Chinese were concerned, and they were required to buy a personal card for identification at the beginning of each year. For purposes of taxation they were divided into three groups: first, indentured laborers of the first and second class and landowners paying taxes of sixty *piastres* (Mexican dollars) or over; second, indentured laborers of the third class and landowners paying between sixty and twenty *piastres* in taxes; third, all others, women and those under fifteen or over sixty years excepted. To leave the colony every Asiatic was made to spend 2 francs for a permit.

In spite of the admirable completeness of these arrangements the Chinese were not kept well in hand, and the expected prosperity was still somewhat painfully awaited. But the French would not give up their centralized system, their cards of identification, their classification by category. Existing regulations¹ there are slightly

¹ Dating from a decree of February 19, 1890.

less severe than of old, but they compel the incoming Asiatic to go to the capital, register at the bureau of immigration, accept a place in one or another of the groups recognized by government, obtain a travelling certificate, have his *permis de séjour* renewed each year, and when he departs receive a passport. The three groups covering all Chinamen are those paying eighty, sixty and seven *piastres* annually in taxes. Anyone found associated with a secret society not authorized by law is heavily punished by fine and imprisonment and then expelled.

In Tongking the situation has been complicated not only by a long conterminous Chinese frontier but also by a sentiment of disgust on the part of Frenchmen toward a country which has cost so much blood and treasure and proved apparently to be of so little worth. Legislation applying to this region, so far from profiting by the experience of Cochinchina, has been of the haphazard sort, and marked beside by an illogical feeling of disappointment which cannot be said to reflect credit upon a civilized nation. Immediately after the conquest a general tax was ordered (in 1885) to be levied on all Chinese alike. In December, 1886, after a protest from Peking, this distinction was made less invidious by applying the tax to all Asiatics whether resident or immigrant. The *carte de séjour* and relegation into categories were also adopted as administrative measures; but here four groups were constituted: those paying three hundred francs and more in taxes, those paying over sixty francs, those owning land, licensed laborers, employés, etc., and lastly common workmen. The yearly cost of the card was fixed at 300, 100, 25 and 10 frs. respectively according to category. But these terms did not suit the Celestial, who stopped coming, and here as elsewhere in this part of the world the European found himself practically helpless without the assistance of Chinamen in his plantations and mines, his boats and wagons, his shops and houses. The laws were again tinkered, the categories extended and amended through a long series of changes, the result of which has been to let down the bars almost entirely and allow the Chinaman to come in on his own terms. By applying for a permit from French consuls in the South China treaty ports he can now travel and traffic for two months in Tongking and Annam without any payment whatever;¹ while for those who choose to remain the categories have been so reduced as to rest very lightly upon the industrial and trading class.

Such treatment as the Chinese have thus far received from the French has not tended to remove difficulties or supplant ancient prejudices. Nor do the French colonists love them much better

¹ Decree of May 15, 1890.

than do other Europeans. Nevertheless the indefatigable Chinaman, who can thrive in a tropical jungle and work like an insect in the sun, is indispensable to French success in Indo-China. There may be some apprehension lest his success there leave no room for his French masters, but without him the Frenchman is as naught; he cannot even exist. The Chinese have already got the whole interior trade of CochinChina in their hands; more than this, they know as well as Europeans how to charter steamers, load them with manufactured articles in the West and bring them to Réunion, India, China, and elsewhere. It is said that during the first trying years of occupation, when the French had only very irregular and uncertain means of communication between CochinChina and the world beyond, the Chinese of Saigon maintained and profited by a regular courier service direct to Canton, where they learned the latest market quotations and easily distanced all their European commercial rivals.

The Dutch, who are to-day the oldest colonial masters remaining in the Indian Archipelago, have the reputation of being more disliked and feared by Asiatics than any other Europeans.¹ This is doubtless owing to the unyielding rigor of a rule which, based primarily on sheer greed of gain, held its monopoly for a century in these waters against all Europe and developed its plantations by means of slavery and forced labor solely for the interest of its own capitalists and stockholders. Alone among Europeans they have succeeded in training tropical islanders to steady labor. The natives of Java being completely under their control furnish an adequate supply of hands for their fields, so that here, at least, there is less economic need for the Chinese than elsewhere in this whole region. In Sumatra and Borneo, which the Dutch only partly and imperfectly control, the determined and often turbulent conduct of Chinese squatters threatening the annihilation of all native Malay authority, both races have accepted the over-lordship of Holland during the present century.² As is usually the case the Chinese are satisfied to let others rule—provided the rule is real—if they can live in peace and earn money.

Long ago an attempt was made with all the implacable determination of the Dutch to limit and repress Chinese immigration into Java. All manner of expedients were tried to annoy them, to throttle their business ventures and prohibit their landing. The

¹ Compare a journal written by Ong Tai Hai in 1790, *Chinese Miscellany*, Canton, 1849, p. 3.

² In 1818, Holland renewed the old rights of the Dutch in Borneo, where about 40,000 Chinese are now supposed to yield them nominal allegiance. The Dutch are still fighting for control of northern Sumatra.

climax was reached when in 1740 Governor Adrian Walkenier tried the good old-fashioned Spanish policy of Massacre. In opposition to his more sensible council he set the populace upon the wretched Chinamen who, taken unawares, defended themselves desperately, but were butchered and burned in their houses or hounded in the end like wild beasts in the jungle, until some ten thousand, it is supposed, perished. This service was so agreeable to the excitable Javanese that their masters, frightened at the awful blood-thirst their order had aroused, were compelled to call out the troops to reduce them to reason. To insure themselves against reprisals they built a number of new forts on the island, and the Chinese were made to live in *kampongs* or settlements by themselves. Though no longer persecuted there, the Chinese of Java are as unpopular as ever with the Dutch, obviously, it may be inferred, because they are less servile than the native islanders and also because their industrial competition is a serious menace to the Dutch monopoly.

The cardinal principle of control applied by Holland to these subjects in her colonies, that of government through intermediaries of their own race, was borrowed from their predecessors the Javanese sovereigns. This, and the invariable practice of keeping them well segregated in *kampongs* apart from the natives is about all the contrivance the Dutch use. It has the merit of simplicity, but it does not relieve the administration from very grave and constant fear of outbreaks between Chinese and Javanese. The problem is not satisfactorily solved. Though the last decree against their immigration was abrogated as useless and impracticable in 1837 the attempt to restrain their coming is maintained by requiring passports and imposing a heavy poll-tax and other dues upon them. But the Chinese are known to hate the Dutch and there is always apprehension lest they forget their customary calm and rebel. Yet they are necessary to the circulation of the wealth of the country, and as all acknowledge by this time there is no doing without them.¹

Looking, now, to the British experience in managing Chinese in their colonies we shall find that they have been successful precisely in proportion as they have been liberal toward this people. Alone of all the Europeans they have not recoiled at contemplating a reservoir of hundreds of millions of this persistent and pro-

¹ Their number at present throughout all the Dutch Indies is roughly estimated at less than half a million, about half of whom live in Java and Madura; not a very formidable total when arrayed against a population of thirty-four million in all these islands; but in the affairs of men it is quality rather than quantity that counts.

creating race ready to flood into any country and fertilize the earth under any climate. In establishing their strategic posts in Further Asia the English needed workmen—traders to supply provisions, coolies to dig and to carry, compradors to clerk and translate, domestics to render life possible to the exotic colonial officer; if these were not forthcoming their stations were doomed to fail, for these were not localities where Europeans could settle and undergo physical fatigues.¹ The Chinese, as usual, were eager and willing to be employed, being attracted by the hope of protection and a chance of gain. They flocked into Singapore and Penang early in this century, as they did to Hong Kong in its middle decades, and as they are doing in Borneo and Burma at its end. In each colony the success from a commercial and administrative standpoint has been astonishing. Let us consider them one by one.

Hong Kong, the smallest but most flourishing British colony in the East, is perhaps the most suggestive for our study of the problem of the Chinaman under European control, and hence deserves attention first. Here, of course, there was no expectation of introducing more than enough Europeans to manage the territory and command its garrison. The Chinese were allowed to form the great bulk of the population and were governed and judged in accordance with their own and not English customs. They have been cautiously and ever so slowly warped into conformity with English law and forms of government, and the process is still going on; but perhaps the main cause of the British success here is due to the caution and liberality with which this race-amalgamation is conducted. It must not be supposed that the task has been altogether easy, even though greatly simplified by having her human experiment-station located as an island in England's element the sea. The natives who swarmed over from the opposite coast were not always of the kind wanted. Many of them indeed were the same sort of insurgents, highwaymen and river-thieves that have been more recently bothering the French in Tongking. They brought over their clan feuds, their passion for larceny and gambling and their generally deplorable morals; they had no conception of cleanliness or hygiene; they despised women, only using them for purposes of prostitution; and lastly they introduced their inevitable secret-society system, with its ramifications throughout all Eastern Asia and its debauching influence on the civic morality of its adherents.

Yet British patience and system overcame the difficulties in-

¹ Compare Professor H. Morse Stephens's account of the administrative systems in these colonies in this REVIEW for January, 1899, p. 246.

volved in managing such a welter of disorderly elements. In the first place they were not afraid. Serene in the consciousness of their ability to manage Asiatics, these Englishmen, unlike the Spanish, the French and the Dutch under somewhat similar circumstances, placed no restrictions upon the coming of all who would help them build up a settlement on an empty island. In the second place they were not too particular. Once in the colony they set the common people apart in a quarter by themselves, watching them closely as was necessary, but interfering as little as possible and avoiding needless irritation. This business of policing the community was one of considerable complexity. Chinese constables of course came cheap and were easily obtained, but they were apt to take bribes and become accomplices in crime. Sepoys from India cost more, but were more reliable than natives for such service, while they were hardier in a tropical climate than Europeans; they lacked tact, however, and failed to inspire the same respect as men of Caucasian race. Englishmen, on the other hand, were excessively costly and likely to succumb easily to the climate, while their ignorance of the language and the people rendered them almost useless in the Chinese quarter. Though no element was effective by itself to constitute a force, the combination of all three proved completely successful. A police service was organized which in 1860 contained 60 Europeans, mostly officers, 300 Indians, and 110 Chinese; thirty years later it had 100 Europeans and 200 Indians against 400 Chinese, the latter secured by a bond of \$50 each.

A stern insistence upon the perfect equality of all men before the law was a feature of British rule that not only earned general approval among the natives but flattered their national pride. It was an epoch in the life of a nation when the first white man was hanged for the murder of a Chinaman on British soil, and the lesson of that judgment has not yet been forgotten. Piracy, for centuries one of the chief activities on the waters of South China, has demanded constant attention there. It is still fearfully prevalent in the obscurer bights and channels of the Archipelago, but in the early days of both Singapore and Hong Kong it had reached the proportions of a profession which engaged all the more enterprising element in the sea-faring population and had become a menace to foreign trade. But the merciless pursuit of their countrymen, and often enough of the near friends and relatives of Chinese living at Hong Kong, did not arouse these colonists in the least. On the contrary they respected a power that knew how to make its rule felt on the side of law and order. For the Chinaman, whose god is gold, understands the excessive risks of its worship under

conditions of anarchy. He may not object to gains to be got by robbery, but he usually prefers legal to illegal means of earning his living, not for moral reasons but because it is in the long run more profitable.

The customs and prejudices of Chinese living under British control in Hong Kong are violated as little as possible. Their section is always crowded, their domestic habits often filthy and unwholesome, their women immoral. But unless these unpleasantnesses palpably threaten the public health they are ignored. The Chinese, however, who overflow into the better built "foreign" quarter have to conform to European usages. For the rest education must be left to accomplish the Herculean task of cleaning the Chinaman's habitation by purifying his mind and morals. Schools are opened there to the very humblest in the social scale and their influence and success are encouraging.¹ Nor are the English more jealous of the increase of wealth among the Chinese living there than of their increased intelligence. Here is a significant contrast: In 1876 the twenty largest taxpayers in Hong Kong included twelve Europeans paying \$62,523, and eight Chinese paying \$28,267; in 1881 the same group comprised only three Europeans against seventeen Chinese, the latter paying about \$100,000.² At present it would be safe, probably, to look for all the richest men in the colony among its Chinese residents. Nevertheless both they and the British know that it is the Englishman who brings and safeguards all this wealth. A community in Eastern Asia needs no fairer assurance of stability and content than such a conviction.

To understand British methods of dealing with the Chinese it is suggestive to examine some typical experiences in the government of Hong Kong. In 1844, when the infant colony was quite naturally alarmed at the influx of disorderly elements from the mainland, the governor tried to impose a poll-tax on all residents of the island alike; the action was thought to be too sudden and comprehensive and was withdrawn, after protests from the foreigners, in favor of a registration system applying only to the lower orders of Chinese. Among the acts of Sir John Bowring was one giving natives the privilege of owning British vessels and using the British flag on craft registered in the colony³—one of which happened to be the famous lorcha *Arrow*, the immediate cause of the second war be-

¹ E. J. Eitel, *Europe in China: The History of Hongkong*, 1895. In 1852 the colony, with 37,000 inhabitants, had 134 pupils in five schools. Within less than a half-century this has grown to some 6,800 pupils in 109 schools, besides 2,000 more who attend private establishments, out of a population reckoned at 250,000.

² J. Chailley-Bert, *The Colonization of Indo-China*, English transl., p. 85.

³ Ordinances 4, 1855, and 9, 1856.

tween England and China. Another recognized Chinese wills, made in accordance with Chinese law and usage, in colonial courts.¹ Another established cemeteries, instead of allowing indiscriminate private burial.² Another organized control over Chinese living on the island through their recognized *Tipos*, or headmen, and also established a census bureau ;³ while another removed the old monopoly of the market for food-stuffs from the hands of two or three favored compradors.⁴

The so-called cadet-system, introduced by Sir Hercules Robinson in 1860 for the better government of the Chinese in the colony, had in view two chief things : first, that the natives should understand the governor's ordinances, second that the governor should understand the objections or desires of the Chinese. The first of these was fairly secured by having ordinances touching the Chinese translated and published in their language.⁵ The next point involved the abandonment of Bowring's application of the Dutch system of control through native gild-leaders⁶ and intrusting all Chinese matters to the registrar-general. But to be effective the governor was careful to appoint to this office only men who were both acquainted with the life and language of China and were also in full sympathy with the people. This difficult end was achieved by his somewhat famous cadet scheme, which provided the colony with a staff of civil-service young men, who were brought to Hong Kong to study the language and promoted when qualified to places in the department. From this trained and tried corps the registrar is now always chosen, and upon his personal qualifications and ability depend for the most part the peace and happiness of more than two hundred thousand individuals. Fifty years of these and other carefully conducted experiments have shown how readily the Chinese yield to and appreciate the benefits of an enlightened rule. But when asked to love the European for himself or to accept his philosophy of life, they steadily and persistently refuse. They show none of the blind fidelity of the negro, none of the almost chivalrous loyalty of the Sikh, nor of the admiration of the Japanese, when associated with the European. "On the Chinese side there is as yet," rather mournfully observes the historian of Hong Kong,

¹ Ord. 4, 1856.

² Ord. 12, 1856.

³ Ord. 8, 1858.

⁴ Ord. 9, 1858.

⁵ A separate and complete issue of the *Hong Kong Government Gazette* is now published in Chinese.

⁶ Ord. June 30, 1861. Substantially a return to Captain Elliot's original policy of 1841, with which the colony started.

"no desire to see the chasm that still separates Chinese and European life in this country bridged over."¹

Though further removed from China the necessity of engaging the Chinese on their side impressed the founders of Singapore no less than those of Hong Kong, and here after a period of hesitation somewhat the same policy of supervision was devised as in the younger colony. As the key of the Malacca Straits established at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars its questions of military defence were obviously most important in the beginning, but its permanent prosperity as a commercial station depended upon the way in which the Chinese made use of the opportunities offered to co-operate as individuals with the efforts and intention of the British. Those members of the colonial administration best fitted by their knowledge or special aptitude to deal with these people were put into a special department for the purpose, and at its head was an officer called the Protector of the Chinese. Here and in the other Straits Settlements the Chinese came into competition both with the Malay native and with the Hindu coolie; but the Chinese have proved themselves, both in the sugar plantations, at the mines and about the towns, to be in the long run cheaper than their competitors. They now constitute by far the largest element in the colony² and have practically monopolized the retail trade and provision business.

From accounts brought to them in the early days, of the formidable nature of Chinese secret societies, their riotous and unholy conclaves and their tendency to supplant legitimate government, the colonial authorities in the Straits were at first inclined to insist on their suppression. Fortunately it was felt, rather than formally concluded, that this was impracticable. Such a policy would inevitably have antagonized the whole Chinese population and probably have landed the English where the Spanish were at the end of their colonial career. There is always a better way of dealing with this extraordinary proclivity towards combination; by working in harmony with rather than against the racial instinct, by ordering the registration of all societies and only moving against the illegitimate, by using the societies as intermediaries and by rather ostentatiously engaging the good offices of their headmen, a great change for the better was effected.³ The poor Chinaman who is not a member now

¹ E. J. Eitel, *Europe in China*, pp. v, 574. See also P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes*; H. Norman, *Peoples and Politics*; and Eitel's *Handbook to Hong Kong*, 1893. "The Ordinances of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong" were last published in the colony in quarto in 1890-1891, four volumes.

² About 235,000, against 214,000 Malays and 54 natives of India, Singapore, Penang, and Malacca.

³ See J. D. Vaughan's *Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements*, 1879; F. Ratzel, *Die chinesische Auswanderung*, pp. 198-219; G. Schlegel,

no longer fears to testify against a *hwui* nor to call upon the courts for protection when one of them tries to harass or rob him. On the whole, considering that he is bound to come, that he is determined to live in his own fashion, that he is indispensable to the material success of these centres of international trade, and that he is callous and unimaginative to a degree unknown in other races, the Chinaman has been admirably managed, though it must be confessed he has not been mastered, by the Englishman in his colonies of the further East.

In North Borneo the protectorate may be seen passing through certain of the phases which marked the early years of Penang and Singapore. Here and in Raja Brooke's dominion of Sarawak the Chinese are for the most part either pirates or the descendants of pirates, and the old hostility between them and the truculent Malays is apt to break out at times in bloody frays.¹ The Chinese accumulate in towns as soon as these are founded and strengthen and develop them by stimulating financial enterprises which would fail without their aid; but the English appear to distrust them here rather more than they do elsewhere, and under the influence of this solicitude they have been rather less successful with them in these than in their other colonies.

In Burma, on the contrary, where the cultivation, mining, building and commerce of the country have long been in either Parsi or Chinese hands, the Celestial is a welcome assistant to the British administrator. Unhappily here as everywhere on the border of southern China those who flock across the frontier show a disposition to go marauding through the loosely settled districts; but in this region they presently marry native girls—treating them much better than do Shan and Burmese husbands—and eventually remain to multiply and implant their characteristic institutions. The situation in Upper Burma after the British absorption in 1885 was in many respects peculiar. The region had long been harried by roving dakoits, the result of King Theebaw's misrule, and this afforded Chinese filibusters tempting opportunities which were not altogether neglected. Their numerical preponderance in Bhamo had years before converted the town into a Chinese stronghold and *point d'appui* for further aggressions, while the nearness of their own

Thian ti hwui, Batavia, 1866; and the present writer's paper on "Chinese and Medieval Gilds" in the *Yale Review* for August and November, 1892. The chief danger to the peace of the colony from the Chinese now lies in the ancient rivalries between immigrants from Fuhkien and Kwangtung provinces, which seem to breed a hate that never dies. Sometimes these clan fights are little civil wars.

¹ G. Schlegel, *Les Kongsis Chinois à Bornéo*, in the *Revue Coloniale Internationale*, Leyden, September, 1885.

borders, across which they could always retire for refuge and assistance, rendered their pursuit and punishment extremely difficult. These conditions, combined with the physical obstacles presented by jungle-clad mountains and trackless wildernesses, made the task of introducing order very trying. But after some ill-advised severity, the result of inexperience, the Chief Commissioner adopted a policy of not only conciliating but frankly welcoming the Chinese. Instead of showing fear he encouraged them to come in and settle. The whole Irrawaddy valley is now practically theirs to occupy and exploit at will. The certainty of very profitable harvests and likely ventures is already bringing over a better class of immigrants from China, who will not tolerate the turbulence of the old set. So by engaging the Chinese as their partners in a complicated bit of colonial exploitation the British have, while purposely surrendering a valuable region to those best able to exploit it, secured the warm and enthusiastic approval of a people who will strengthen and enrich the empire and will, if only for their own selfish ends, stoutly resist the encroachments of any foreign power desirous of military occupation and consequently of interfering in their prosperity.¹

To sum up: it is evident that we have a very different phase of Chinese immigration in the East from that which presents itself in the sparsely populated regions of the temperate zones where white men can both work and dwell. In Indo-China and the Archipelago it is palpably impossible to keep the Chinese altogether out, and it is as obviously madness to attempt to do so if the rulers of colonies there desire to check anarchy and render their possessions profitable. Unwelcomed and unloved though they may be by all races alike, we cannot deny them qualities which make for permanence and material success. Their unpopularity may in some degree be attributed to their virtues, which by carrying them triumphantly through the competition of modern industrial life incur the lasting enmity of their rivals who are left behind. It is this dislike rather than ineradicable aloofness on their part which makes it convenient or necessary to segregate them in quarters by themselves when dwelling abroad. If treated fairly they assist rather than thwart the work of municipal administration by setting the machinery of their social organizations to act in its defence. To the charge that these societies are a menace to governments under which they exist obscurely, it may properly be asked whether there is any known instance of their subverting a government that had proved itself fit to

¹ Compare Dilke's *Problems of Greater Britain*, p. 461; J. Chailley-Bert, *Colonization of Indo-China*, Part 2; Isabelle Massieu, *Une Colonie Anglaise*, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 15, 1899.

rule. The fact is that while the most democratic people in the world in their social and commercial relations, the Chinese are by temperament believers in absolute monarchy, and are for the most part indifferent to affairs of state and politics provided these are so conducted as to leave them in peace.

From the standpoint of the colonial governor it is eminently necessary to watch the character and quantity of the Chinese tide, and to check the tendency of this people to manipulate things for their own particular ends. If allowed, the Chinese will overwhelm and efface the European, as is the case in Portuguese Macao ; yet if too severely repressed, as in the Philippines and Tongking, the result economically speaking is almost as disastrous, for the colony ceases to thrive and dies eventually of inanition. It is to us active and eager Westerners a strange compound of passiveness and courage, despicable at first view, but afterwards found to be invincible. As the Prophet Isaiah declared of the ancient Egyptians, " Their strength is to sit still."

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